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Abstract 
 
This chapter makes the case that access to the spaces of public debate in post-
apartheid South Africa is about the challenge of political representation as much as it 
is about the challenge of access to communication technologies. These 
representational issues centre on the racialised and partisan nature of state-society 
relations framed, in part, through identity discourses and, for many poor citizens, 
patronage politics linked to local governance. In the urban setting this often also takes 
a spatial form linked to the neighbourhood or community, and involves local leaders 
who invoke the exclusive right to mediate for poor and marginalised groups in the 
name of liberation nationalism and service delivery – elsewhere termed the politics of 
the ‘party-society’. This representational politics creates two distinct publics: one that 
limits democratic citizenship by affirming racial hierarchies over equal rights, and for 
poorer, black communities, by constricting citizen voice independent of party 
sanction. It produces a form of ‘mediated’ citizenship in which third-party 
representatives and the ways in which they ‘speak for’ citizens come to define (and 
often limit) possibilities for inclusive, democratic citizenship (vVon Lieres and & 
Piper 2014).  
Illustrated through the case of two newspapers in Hout Bay, the chapter shows 
how the main community newspaper, The Sentinel, gives voice overwhelmingly to 
white and wealthy residents of Hout Bay; views that at least some black residents 
perceive as racist. Further, attempts by ANC-aligned local leaders to counter the 
perceived bias of The Sentinel through their own paper, Hout Bay Speak, does not 
necessarily give voice to all poor, black residents. This is most evident in its 
deliberately ignoring the existence of community leaders not aligned with the party 
hierarchy in Hout Bay. This racialised and partisan character of state-society relations 
is a significant constraint on constructing a more inclusive public sphere in Hout Bay, 





It is widely accepted that the formation of public opinion that genuinely reflects the 
views of citizens, even if not necessarily a consensus, and even if only indirectly 
impactful on formal state institutions, is critical to contemporary democratic 
governance. South Africa is no exception in this regard, with many formal 
commitments to democratic practice beyond the authorisation of representatives at 
periodic elections, such as a free press, and other civil and political rights 
foundational to a plural and largely unrestricted public realm. 
Notably, these democratic commitments are twinned with a commitment to 
economic and social development, including the notion that the state should be a 
developmental one committed to addressing poverty, inequality and its racial forms 
inherited from the past. This conception of the developmental state is nowhere better 
illustrated than in the burdensome design of post-apartheid local government. Made 
responsible for much of service delivery including water, electricity, most roads, 
sanitation, but also to some extent in housing, education and health (through control 
of land), local government is also required to work more democratically than other 
spheres of the state. This is manifest not just through regular elections, but through 
requirements for democratic practice between elections summed up as ‘participatory 
governance’ (see Barichievy et al. 2005). This set of legal obligations includes 
institutions like ward committees and ward forums, requirements for public 
consultation on budget, development planning and the like. In addition, development 
projects not administered by local government also have a requirement for some form 
of public consultation. 
It is now widely recognised that this model of participatory local governance 
in South Africa is not a success (Atkinson 2007;  Bénit-Gbaffou 2008, & 2015). This 
is mostly evident through the substantial scale of protest by poor communities 
justified in terms of frustration at poor service delivery and the broken promises of 
local leaders. In addition, there is lots of research to show that participatory 
governance is generally not effective at giving citizens voice, and tends to be captured 
for other politics, usually partisan, or local factions within the party, contending for 
office and its spoils. While incompetence is a large factor in this politics, so is a 
burgeoning politics of patronage and corruption, perhaps best symbolised by 
controversial R350 million security upgrades to the President’s personal residence at 
Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal. 
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One of the issues raised by the vexed attempt at democratic development 
through local governance in South Africa, is the viability of democratic institutions 
without democratic citizens – a problem categorised as one of ‘political culture’ in 
mainstream political science. More specifically, can we expect institutions of plural or 
liberal democracy, fashioned through elite bargaining, to work in a country where 
many people are not fully committed to equality or individual rights but still think in 
terms of contending race groups with differential entitlements? A key claim of this 
chapter is that these ideas of race, rooted in the contending Afrikaner/white and 
African/liberation nationalisms of the apartheid era, linger on into the present, albeit 
often inchoately and in hybridised ways, and serve to constrain who is regarded as 
entitled to speak, in what terms, and on what authority.  
In what follows, we trace how public debate around developmental local 
governance in one site, Hout Bay, expresses these enduring anti-egalitarian ideas, and 
how, when entwined with patronage politics linked to accessing state resources, 
shapes not only who can get what and when, but who gets to speak in public too. In 
effect we show how the convergence of apartheid-era ideas with the logics of 
developmental local governance undermine democratic citizenship. Democratising 
the public realm in Hout Bay is thus a story not just about access to technologies of 
communication, although this is clearly important, but about recognising the silencing 
(and at times unconscious) legacy of racism, and the constricting effects of party 
sanction on popular voice. It is thus about the ‘right to have rights’ in two different 
ways: the right to be recognised as fully human, and the right to speak without 
authorisation from above. 
In making this case, we begin by outlining the theoretical assumptions and 
framing of the argument in respect of democracy and the public realm, especially as 
regards to nationalism, race and citizenship, and then by relating these to an account 
of state-society relations in post-apartheid South Africa, especially the ‘party-society’ 
politics of poor, black urban communities (Piper 2015). This framework is then 
applied to the case of Hout Bay, with a focus on the public debate around a number of 
development projects, most recently a new clinic proposed for a central location in a 
wealthy part of the settlement. The chapter explores media representations on these 
questions through comparing and contrasting two newspapers, The Sentinel and Hout 




[A]Democratic citizenship, racial nationalism and partisan state-–society 
relations 
It is widely accepted that democracy under modern conditions is more than elections, 
and involves a variety of means of translating the idea of the rule of the people into 
governance. A key element here is the idea that the development of public opinion 
through a public sphere, or a range of spheres, is central to democratic governance, 
even if it only impacts indirectly on actual decision-making. For As Habermas (1991), 
described it in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1991), the public 
sphere is an area in social life where individuals can come together to discuss freely 
and to identify societal problems, and through that discussion influence political 
action. While writing overtly about rise and decline of a bourgeois public sphere in 
the 18th century, the idea that contemporary democracy requires a sphere or realm for 
inclusive and deliberative opinion formation is echoed in his later work, and has a 
central relationship to the media, which is inevitably involved in many interactions 
between the millions of people who comprise modern states. 
This idea that modern democratic society requires a space or spaces where 
citizens can deliberate on issues of common concern in an uncoerced and unrestricted 
way, as facilitated by various forms of media, has been taken up widely.   A variety of 
debates ensue, including whether this is best conceived as one sphere that is all-
inclusive and deliberative, or a multitude of spheres or various characters, that may be 
linked in various ways. Hence, in a famous response to Habermas, Fraser (1992) 
points out what she sees as the exclusive nature of the bourgeois public sphere for 
women and others, and how deliberation can be used as a mask for domination, 
effectively shifting political power from ‘a repressive mode of domination to 
a hegemonic one’. The exclusions of the public sphere that Habermas does not 
identify lead Fraser to make the case for counter-publics – spaces, venues and 
processes where marginalized groups formed their own views of the social order. 
Indeed, as outlined below, the emergence of Hout Bay Speak and its self-conception 
as giving voice to those not represented in The Sentinel can be read in this light.  
The implication for contemporary democracy is that it may be important, 
especially in deeply divided societies, to acknowledge the inevitability of forms of 
exclusion and the value of a variety of publics, some explicitly counter the dominant 
one. The implication for democratic citizenship is that a formally open society with a 
free media is not necessarily enough for marginalised groups to feel empowered or 
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recognised as legitimate to participate in just one space through one medium. Writing 
about media in South Africa, Berger (2002: 31) notes that the status and influence of a 
public sphere (even if heterogeneous) may fluctuate in relation to the balance of 
dominant voices within it. If, for example, government media predominates and 
propaganda about leaders’ speeches is primarily what is heard in the public sphere, 
then this realm is likely to reinforce state power. Furthermore, counter-publics and 
alternative media may well produce their own exclusions, as we shall also 
demonstrate below.  
Indeed, as argued in Vvon Lieres and Piper (2014: 1-–2) one reason for these 
exclusions is that relations between states and citizens are often mediated by third 
party intermediaries who often have their own agendas. Third-party intermediaries 
who speak for citizens can sometimes facilitate democratic representation through 
teaching people about rights, self-representation and agency. At times third-party 
representatives can contribute to a democratic politics, capable of addressing some of 
the weaknesses of both liberal representative democracy and participatory 
governance. (Huq & Mahmud 2014; Robins and & Fleisch 2014,; Huq and Mahmud 
2014, Vvon Lieres 2014). A recent process of engagement by an environmental 
group, trying to bring all voices together in Hout Bay to formulate a plan to address 
water and waste issues in the area, demonstrates this potential.  
However, in many cases mediators produce anti-democratic outcomes for 
citizenship (Wheeler 2014). In particular, we draw attention to intermediaries not 
formally authorised to speak for poor and marginalised groups, but who claim the 
legitimacy to do so on a variety of grounds and with various implications for 
democracy. In this chapter we showcase a form of political representation that is 
informal in that it is not authorised by law, but claims exclusive legitimacy in terms of 
liberation nationalism. This is a form of representative ‘capture’ (Wheeler 2014:8) 
that has yielded mixed democratic outcomes, asserting an important view from poor, 
black communities but at the expense of at least some rivals.  
In addition to requiring reflection on questions of democracy and publics, our 
case in Hout Bay also requires we say something more about citizenship and its 
relationship with nationalism, in particular the egalitarian and individual rights-
bearing conception of citizenship entailed in the South African constitution of 1996, 
and the group hierarchies of race that endure from the contending nationalisms of the 
apartheid era. Here we use the idea of citizenship as more than one of legal status in 
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respect of state membership, identifying substantive and normative conceptions too. 
Substantively, we take citizenship to reflect the agency people actually have in respect 
of the state, and as thus treat it as an open empirical question; whereas normatively 
we take democratic citizenship to mean something like free and equal membership of 
a state with associated civil, political and social-economic rights àa la T.H. Marshall 
(1950). 
Nationalism, in contrast, is the claim that a group, more specifically a self-
sustaining group or ‘a people’ form the legitimate basis of the state. Although 
historically a critical idea through which inclusion of ‘the masses’ in the institutions 
of modernity was justified, nationalism and nations offer a conception of state-society 
relations that is potentially in conflict with the normative conception of democratic 
citizenship. Hence, the classical ethnic nationalisms of 19th- century Europe located 
popular sovereignty within group that was ethnically defined (Hobsbawm 1990). This 
conception of the nation limits citizenship to only certain residents who belong to the 
right group. In South Africa’s recent past this would include the ethnic and racial 
exclusions of Afrikaner and white nationalisms (Moodie 1975), or the racial 
ambivalences of African nationalism (Walsh 1987).  
As Hobsbawm (1990: 169), notes, 19th- century European ethnic nationalism 
was followed by waves of different kinds, specifically the anti-colonial nationalisms 
of the post-World War II period, and then the self-consciously multi-cultural 
nationalisms of largely immigrant societies like Canada. Imagined more on common 
political grounds than cultural or ethnic, these nationalisms exist more easily with 
egalitarian and individual conceptions of democratic citizenship as legitimacy is not 
connected to group identities. Further, as illustrated by Kymlicka (1995), it is possible 
to reconcile collective or special groups rights with individual rights under certain 
formulations – principally in terms of enhancing equal access to rights to all and thus 
deconstructing rather than reconstructing group-based social hierarchies.  
As illustrated below, the ideas of racial hierarchy that endure from apartheid-
era nationalisms, and are to some extent reproduced into the present, serve to 
undermine notions of egalitarian and individual citizenship, albeit in different ways 
for different groups. For example, enduring ideas of white supremacy, whether 
consciously framed or not, can dovetail with the bio-political logic of governance 
that, as Chatterjee (2004) notes, tends to treat poor people as populations to be 
managed rather than citizens bearing rights. More mundanely it can serve to 
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delegitimise ‘black’ voices by ignoring, silencing or disabling deliberation before it 
even starts. In this regard, the discourse of land invasion, whether by ‘foreigners’, 
‘refugees’, or ‘bussing from the eastern Eastern cape’Cape’, takes on greater 
significance.  
Conversely, while the idea of ‘the racist’ can be invoked to silence voice, and 
is well commented upon in the public domain in South Africa, more important is the 
ambivalence in the liberation nationalism of the ANC and others towards non-
racialism (Anciano 2014). This manifests in a privileged role for the historically 
oppressed, who are racially defined, and poses a challenge for egalitarian and 
individual conceptions of citizenship, although more so in terms of first access to state 
office and state resources, rather than exclusion. More important in the Hout Bay case 
are the implications of the idea of ‘ANC entitlement to rule’ for popular 
representation for poor, black communities in Hout Bay.  
Heller (2009) makes the case that, as in India, political society tends to 
dominate civil society in South Africa. In line with this general claim, the case has 
been made for how this works at the local or community level in South Africa through 
a combination of liberation nationalist ideology and patronage politics mediated 
through the ANC and its allies (Piper 2015; Piper & & Anciano 2015). Termed the 
politics of the ‘party-state’, it centres on the attempt to monopolise the representation 
of poor, black communities to the state and others by leaders aligned with the ANC. 
Legitimated through the idea of the ANC’s entitlement to rule, and reinforced through 
the capacity to deliver state resources to the community, this politics is informal but 
important. It is also often hotly contested, but almost always within ‘party-society’ 
logic. Thus protest may lead to new leaders, but almost always ones aligned to the 
same party, in the same patronage relations with local government. In short, the space 
for voices unsanctioned by the ANC is relatively constrained.   As we shall see this is 
certainly the case in Imizamo Yethu in Hout Bay, although ‘party-state’ plays a lesser 
role in the predominantly white valley.  
Of course, the dominance of civil society by political society is not absolute, 
as evidenced by the emergence of social movements rooted in poor, black 
communities, independent, and for some, even overtly critical, of the ANC and its 
allies. However, they are relatively few in number and often struggle to sustain 
themselves independently of state or donor support. More sustainable are 
professionalised non-governmental organisation (NGO)-type social movements such 
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as the Treatment Action Campaign and Sonke Gender Justice that look to combine 
branches in poor, black areas, with middle-class and professionalised leadership from 
the suburbs (Robins 2014). However, these movements tend to focus on policy at 
national or city levels. Politics at the most local level is likely to be more about 
informal leaders who monopolise voice in partisan terms and produce, at best, a form 
of mediated and exclusionary citizenship.    
In what follows, we explore how public debate around developmental local 
governance in one site, Hout Bay, manifests these forms of exclusion in a formally 
open and inclusive governance process, as exemplified in The Sentinel and Hout Bay 
Speak newspapers. We begin by introducing the case-study site, and tracing these 
exclusionary dynamics through development projects around housing, water, and 
most recently health. 
  
[A]Hout Bay: Microcosm of post-apartheid Cape Town 
Famous for its beautiful and striking setting, Hout Bay is also regarded as a 
microcosm of Cape Town, and indeed South Africa, as it contains three distinct 
communities living side by side. Hence, the overwhelming majority of Imizamo 
Yethu, Hangberg and the Valley (see Figure 8.1) are black African, coloured and 
white respectively. As summarized in Table 1 these three communities, the Valley, 
Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu encapsulate much of the racial, socio-economic and 
cultural diversity of Cape Town more broadly. Further, many of the challenges that 
confront Hout Bay reflect those of the wider country. 
  




Source: City of Cape Town (2013) 
 
In looking at the social profile of Hout Bay, it is striking how race, class and place 
coincide to a significant degree. This, of course, was the project of apartheid, and its 
enduring form in Hout Bay reflects the degree to which it is yet to be undone. Hence, 
the smallest settlement in spatial terms, Imizamo Yethu, is home to the most people, 
with 47% of the population squeezed into about 40 hectares of land. Not surprisingly 
the vast majority of residents, 77% are living in informal housing, and many are 
recent immigrants over the last decade with Imzamo Yethu founded only in 1992 
(City of Cape Town 2013). 
This recent and rapid settlement helps explain the relative lack of formal 
housing as indicated by similar unemployment rates, income levels and education 
levels between black African and coloured residents (City of Cape Town 2013). 
Given the links between formal housing and piped water, sanitation and refuse 
collection much of the difference between Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg can be 
explained in terms of significant in-migration into Imizamo Yethu in a short period, 
compared to a long established and relatively stable population in Hangberg. 
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Lastly, it is noteworthy that a significant proportion of the population of 
Imizamo Yethu are from elsewhere in Africa. Some are migrants, like the Ovambo 
from Namibia and Angola, whose presence stretches back to the early 1990s, and are 
mostly men working in the fishing industry. More recent immigrants include families 
from Zimbabwe, Malawi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and beyond. It is 
also common cause that the population of Imizamo Yethu is under-estimated in the 
formal census count of 2011, not least due to the high proportion of foreign residents 
many of whom would avoid state officials due to their illegal status and fear of 
repression.  
Given this, it is not surprising to hear that Imizamo Yethu has also 
experienced waves of xenophobic violence, principally in 2008, although also since 
then. More dangerous aspects of life, however, emerge due to the consequences of a 
dense, poor and informal settlement – high levels of insecurity, regular fires every 
couple of years that destroy shacks and take lives, and poor health conditions from 
lack of adequate sanitation, poor diet and a large population of rats and other vermin. 
 
Table 8.1: Demographics of Hout Bay 
 Black 
African 
Coloured Asian White Other Total 
Population 15391 6345 162 9797 1173 32868 
 47% 19% 0.5% 30% 3.5% 100% 
Unemployment 31.7% 32% 8.8% 3.3% 17% 23% 
Formal Housing 28% 73% 80% 99% 38% 57.5% 
Water 29% 85% 71% 99% 48,5% 60% 
Flush Toilets 62,5% 88% 92% 99% 94,5% 79% 
Refuse 63% 96% 96% 99% 80% 80% 
Electricity (light) 80% 98% 100% 99% 96% 89% 
Source: City of Cape Town (2013) 2011 Census Suburb Hout Bay. Compiled by 
Strategic Development Information and GIS Department, City of Cape Town 
 
If the black African population who constitute 96% per cent of the residents of 
Imizamo Yethu are the worst off in Hout Bay in terms of socio-economic rights, the 
overwhelmingly coloured community of Hangberg is only slightly better off in terms 
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of income, and actually a little worse off in terms of education. The most substantial 
difference is in terms of formal housing, and its associated benefits, as reflected in 
Table 1. However, not reflected in these socio-economic indicators are widely 
referred to social ills of alcohol and drug abuse, gangsterism and perlemoen 
smuggling. Historically a community of fisher folk, Hangberg has been on the decline 
with the demise of the small fishing industry in the last, approximately, 15 years or 
so. In this depressed context, substance abuse and various illegal activities have 
become common.  
The third and most well off section of the community are the residents of what 
is collectively termed ‘the Valley’ that constitutes most of Hout Bay, where 99%  per 
cent of white people reside. White residents are substantially better off than coloured 
or black African residents. Indeed, Hout Bay is part of the Atlantic seaboard, the 
wealthiest part of Cape Town, known for many residents from Europe, sometimes 
called ‘European swallows’ for the seasonal nature of their presence. Notably then, 
the extreme differences of wealth in Hout Bay are exacerbated by migrants at both 
ends of the socio-economic spectrum: wealthier European ‘swallows’ who live in 
‘The the Valley’, and poorer African ‘foreigners’ who live in Imizamo Yethu. 
The ‘Valley’ is a collection of a number of suburbs located between Imizamo 
Yethu and Hangberg on the mountains to the East and West respectively. Notably, the 
location of these two settlements on the slopes of the surrounding mountains marks 
Hout Bay as distinct from apartheid design in one important respect: wealthy, white 
residents can see poor black settlements. Further, the black African settlement is not 
mediated from the historically whites-only area by a coloured one in between. This 
fact has made a difference to the local development of Hout Bay in that the vision of 
poverty has reportedly informed some foreign white philanthropists to initiate 
development projects in Imizamo Yethu.1. 
Fundamentally then, Hout Bay reflects the diversity of South Africa in 
identity, socio-economic and spatial terms that illustrate quite well the enduring racial 
character of post-apartheid South Africa, albeit with two key differences that typify 
the post-apartheid city. The first is rapid urbanisation and informalisation of urban 
settlements. Hence the City of Cape Town has 356 informal settlements the vast 
majority of which are post-apartheid creations.2 The second is greater migration from 
outside South Africa’s borders, mostly but not exclusively from the rest of Africa. 
Hence it is apparent how in these ways Hout Bay can be seen as a microcosm of the 
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wider society, especially when one considers the full range of social issues that 
confront the area. 
  
[A]A double-edged sword: Ddevelopment politics and party influence in Hout 
Bay 
Central to the post-apartheid history of Hout Bay has been the growth of Imizamo 
Yethu, and thus a key feature of local governance has been meeting the development 
needs of this area in particular, but also to a significant extent those of Hangberg. The 
politics of development has been significantly overlain with party politics, such that 
the leadership of Imizamo Yethu is widely recognised as the overtly ANC aligned 
SANCO and, until 2010, the same was true of Hangberg, with the ANC aligned Hout 
Bay Civic Association. Notably, the implementation of development projects in Hout 
Bay has served to undermine both SANCO and the Hout Bay civic, especially in the 
last ten years. Further, that the two issues are connected is revealed by the fact that the 
conflict that has hurt ANC leadership has been around development projects.    
In the case of the Hout Bay civic, the organisation was the largest of a variety 
of not very popular formations in a politically divided settlement until about 2010. 
Like most so-called ‘coloured’ settlements in Cape Town, Hangberg has increasingly 
voted for the Democratic Alliance (DA) over the ANC. In 2010 issues in Hangberg 
came to a head when the city tried to forcibly remove shacks that had been built on 
the firebreak above the formal housing of Hangberg. In what came to be known as the 
‘battle of Hangberg’, residents refused to move and battled police for two days, with 
significant number of injuries to both sides, before a truce was called (IOL 2010).  
In the aftermath of the conflict the government initiated a mediation process 
that led to the formation of the Hangberg Peace and Mediation Forum (PMF) in 2011. 
The PMF is an area–-based structure with representatives elected from different areas 
of the Hangberg settlement. Through the court process the PMF was legally 
sanctioned as the sole representative of the Hangberg community. Not surprisingly, 
the Hout Bay civic, which along with other existing formations, was effectively 
marginalised from representing the community to the city, was deeply unhappy with 
the advent of the PMF. Formally required to be non-partisan, some have described the 
structure as DA aligned; ‘there was a feeling that the forum was a vehicle for the 
DA’.3 Notably, though, by 2015 this attitude has mollified a little, although tensions 
clearly remain, as some of the ANC-aligned leaders in Hangberg now appear to be 
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working with the PMF to access the state around various development initiatives 
including a skills-training centre and an aquaculture project. Simultaneously, several 
leaders of the forum were critical of government’s progress with the various 
commitments of the Accord.4  
A similar story is evident in Imizamo Yethu, although ANC leaders remain 
more central to politics in that settlement. As noted above, the logic of ‘party-society’ 
entails a monopoly of representation of poor, black communities by leaders aligned 
with the ANC, legitimated through the idea of the ANC’s entitlement to rule based in 
its liberation nationalism, and reinforced through the capacity to deliver state 
resources. As noted in Piper and & Benit-Gbaffou (2014), a partial exception to this 
pattern is opened up by the enmity of the DA government to the ANC and its allies in 
Cape Town, creating a potential legitimacy crisis for local leaders from ANC aligned 
communities who are willing to engage the DA developmental governance on its non-
partisan terms.   Thus whereas in most of the rest of South Africa, proximity to the 
ANC is important for accessing the resources of local government, and hence 
dispensing resources critical for poor communities, in Cape Town it is a disadvantage. 
At the same time, embracing the City of Cape Town requirement that community 
representation is ‘non-partisan’ places local leaders at risk of betraying the ANC’s 
entitlement to rule, and being portrayed as sell-outs who are ‘too friendly with the 
whites’.  
This dilemma has been played out in leadership conflicts in SANCO in 
Imizamo Yethu between an ‘old’ SANCO leadership which chose to embrace the 
city’s model of non-partisan representation and invested heavily in participating in all 
the state and governance forums in Hout Bay, and a ‘new’ SANCO which accused the 
‘old’ of being too friendly with the white DA and taking their side in disputes over 
development projects (see Piper && Benit-Gbaffou 2014: 31). The key issue over 
which this conflict manifest was a dispute over whether the city should endorse the 
building of a new primary school paid for mostly by foreign benefactors who live in 
Hout Bay, or use the land for more housing. ANC leaders mobilised against the old 
SANCO leader on this basis and even held a protest march to his house. They then 
organised an election that instituted the ‘new’ SANCO leadership. The legitimacy of 
the election was contested by the ‘old’ SANCO on procedural grounds. The divisions 
within SANCO regionally and nationally have meant that the dispute between these 
contending leadership groups could not be resolved, and remains until this day.  
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That the legitimacy dilemma of ANC loyalty versus accessing the DA state is 
a real one is also reflected in the fact that new SANCO leadership have all failed to 
engage in the various governance forums of Hout Bay. Indeed, there have now been 
several iterations of new SANCO leadership in the last three years, none of which 
have even really tried to access the forums of local governance in Hout Bay, allowing 
the ‘old’ SANCO leadership to continue to represent in these spaces. Several ANC 
aligned leaders have bemoaned the decline of SANCO in Imizamo Yethu from a point 
in the 1990s when it could mobilise thousands to a mass meetings, to today where 
around fifty residents attend.  
Notably, the organisational decline of SANCO should not be read as the 
decline of the legitimacy of the ANC in Imizamo Yethu. The ANC took Imizamo 
Yethu overwhelmingly in the 2014 national election, and ANC networks remain 
strong enough to mobilise people to stop initiatives they do not sanction – most 
recently a Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) Turnaround station at an entrance to the 
settlement. Further, most leaders from Hangberg and the Valley know that there is a 
legitimacy crisis in SANCO but have decided to back off and wait for SANCO to 
resolve its own issues in recognition of the enduring importance and power of the 
ANC in that settlement. 
Paradoxically, then, the history of development politics in Hout Bay over the 
last ten to fifteen years has been a double-edged sword for these communities, as it 
has weakened their most important leadership structures at the same time as bringing 
new houses, new schools, new sports grounds and, currently underway, a new clinic. 
  
Representation in media: The Sentinel and Hout Bay Speak 
A central complaint of ANC leadership in Hangberg and especially Imizamo Yethu, is 
that residents of the Valley in Hout Bay do not have their best interests at heart, and 
they perceive many as racist. As one leader noted, ‘I know for a fact that they don’t 
like black people.’.5 Further, they feel many government officials are suspicious of 
ANC leaders as they are seen as pursuing only an ANC agenda in a DA controlled 
city. Consequently, they complain of being ignored by government, seldom consulted 
by authorities, and when there are public meetings, they complain of being made to 
feel unwelcome and seldom accommodated in deliberations.  
A recent example of this is the current public consultation by provincial 
government for a new ‘polyclinic’ proposed for Hout Bay that will replace the 
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existing clinics in Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu (http://www.hbrra.co.za/node/76). 
Speaking to us of his experiences in this process, the chair of the ANC for Ward 74 
complained about the lack of communication around the meeting, noting that he ‘was 
not invited, and they (the Valley-dominated Hout Bay Ratepayers association) were 
not happy to see me there’.6 He noted that advertising in the local paper, The Sentinel, 
will not reach many residents of Imizamo Yethu. The ANC chair also reported that he 
had to inform the meeting that consulting with the leader of ‘old’ Sanco could not be 
considered as consultation as he now longer represented Imizamo Yethu .7  
Substantively, the ANC chair perceives the representatives from the Hout Bay 
Ratepayers and Residents Association to be racist and he remains unconvinced by 
their objections to the new clinic too: ‘the Ratepayers are saying they say they want 
that place to be green because it is the only piece of land in Hout Bay that is left’. 
However, he takes objection mostly because ‘this issue does not really affect them, 
they all go to private doctors and dentists. The clinic will not affect them, but it will 
make a big difference for us.’8 The support for the Ratepayers by the DA ward 
councillor, confirms his suspicions of racial and political marginalisation.  
Interestingly it is not only the ANC leadership who has a low opinion of the 
Ratepayers Association. Interviews with various officials from the City of Cape Town 
confirmed a general impression of a network of retired, conservative, white men who 
had, until recently, dominated the Ratepayers and associated formations like the 
Heritage Trust, and who city officials experienced as demanding and difficult.9 
According to one official in charge of a department that covers the entire city, the 
most confrontational and rude engagement she experiences from ‘clients’ (the public), 
comes wealthy, white residents on the Atlantic seaboard. ‘I learned some new swear 
words from the emails,’, she said, adding, ‘I had to ask my children what they 
meant.’.10 While this claim was not made specifically in relation to the Ratepayers, it 
speaks to the character of a substantial and influential constituency residentcy in the 
area. Notably, this constituency, is however, not reflective of the whole of the Valley 
as there are a number of residents actively working to address socio-economic 
concerns in Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg. Indeed, generational and ideological 
divisions like this run though all the settlements of Hout Bay.11 
The reference to The Sentinel is instructive, as similar to other community 
newspapers in the City of Cape Town, The Sentinel covers only very local news to 
Hout Bay, but is largely dominated by views and concerns of residents of the Valley. 
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In this regard it is important to note that community newspapers are important, and 
unique, vehicles for advertisers to access local markets (both national and local 
advertise in a ratio of about 40:60), and form part of the Independent Media group 
advertising suite, including The Sentinel (Sharim 2011). This means that they are 
inevitably targeted at consumers rather than the community as a whole. 
Given this, it is no surprise that a cursory glance at the names of the 
contributors and the issues in The Sentinel reflect a view of Hout Bay that is mostly 
‘from the suburbs’. We recall clearly the anger of one SANCO leader at a letter in the 
paper from a resident of the Valley expressing disbelief that nearly 95% of Imizamo 
Yethu had voted for the ANC in the 2014 national election. Somewhat patronisingly, 
the resident stated something to the effect that if a toaster or a kettle broke, people 
would replace them, but why will they not replace a broken political party like the 
ANC. ‘You see how racist they are’, the SANCO leader exclaimed, ‘they compare us 
to broken kettles.’.12 
Further, it is not so easy to access The Sentinel in Imizamo Yethu or 
Hangberg, although it is available. A free newspaper distributed at the major public 
shopping centres and points of public interest, it is usually available at the Hout Bay 
police station, which is situated at one entrance to Imizamo Yethu. However, short of 
going into the police station residents are unlikely to gain access to it. It is not 
available online for instance. Notably, while there is a community library more 
centrally situated in Imizamo Yethu, it seems to stock The Sentinel irregularly. 
Nevertheless, when asked at a workshop discussing environmental concerns in Hout 
Bay who reads The Sentinel nearly half the participants from Imizamo Yethu, 
including several school children, indicated they do.13 
 







At a recent stop at the Imizamo Yethu community library we found a copy of a new 
newspaper for Hout Bay, called Hout Bay Speaks. Like The Sentinel it appears to be a 
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free newspaper committed to local news, but unlike The Sentinel it is not part of the 
Independent Media advertising stable, and it is focused exclusively on the issues that 
confront Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg. Hence, on page 3 it states: 
 
Welcome to the first edition of Hout Bay Speak, community members and 
organisations believe it is long over due that a newspaper that can voice the 
concerns, aspirations, anxieties and struggles of the communities of Hangberg 
and Imizamo Yethu should see the light of day. Following is ([sic)] messages 
from some of the community organisations showing their public support for 
the publication of a newspaper that aims to reflect the lives of the whole 
community of Hout Bay. 
 
Notable in this regard is a heading on the front page that exclaims, ‘Let’s be heard’. 
What follows are photos and endorsements from ANC aligned leadership, although 
no political party leaders are explicitly included. Notably by their absence are the 
PMF and the leaders of ‘old’ SANCO in Imizamo Yethu who are not currently 
endorsed by ANC leadership. Further the substance of the newspaper reflects the 
issues and language of the liberation movement tradition. Hence the main heading on 
the edition is ‘Give back our land!’, and the edition includes articles on unemployed 
youth and building a united sports movement. 
 





In many ways this brief contrast between The Sentinel and Hout Bay Speaks provides 
a vignette of the larger dynamic of community representation in the public spheres of 
Hout Bay. The Sentinel largely represents the views of the organised forms of the 
white and wealthy Valley. Dominated by the view from the suburbs, other voices 
struggle to emerge. Conversely, Hout Bay Speak is self-consciously framed as an 
intervention in the public domain intended to add the views of poor, black 
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communities to the larger conversation about Hout Bay. Notably however, it does so 
in a somewhat partisan way, obviously ignoring important other leaders and thus 
perspectives from the poorer, black communities. 
 
[A]Conclusion 
The relationship between The Sentinel and Hout Bay Speak is a metaphorical, if 
partial, image of the larger public sphere in Hout Bay, one that is dominated by 
historically white and wealthy people from the suburbs, and where more marginal 
voices from poorer, black communities tend to be monopolised by party leaders. Our 
explanation of this politics points to the enduring significance of notions of race for 
political identity in South Africa, conceptions rooted in contending nationalisms of 
the apartheid era, now evolving in new ways, but largely maintained by class, as well 
as the dependence of poor residents on the state for access to key services, and the 
largely partisan nature of access to the state.  
For some in the organisations representing wealthier, white residents this 
legacy dovetails with forms of governance that treats the urban poor as populations to 
be managed, rather than citizens bearing rights. Thus while overtly racist language is 
rare in the public realm, its legacy can be seen in the ease with which some embrace 
governance categories that deny a common humanity. This noted, there are also other, 
newer, strains in the public realm that eschew racism, but these voices are taking time 
to become cohesive. Conversely, organisations aligned to the ANC tend to portray an 
exclusive right to represent poor, black communities, sometimes in ways that ignore 
or marginalise other voices. Hence, both the dominant ‘white’ voice in the public 
sphere and the ANC aligned ‘counter-public’ manifest forms of representation that 
limit access to public debate in ways other than through access to institutional forums 
or communication technology. 
Notably, these two discourses are connected. The perceived and real racism of 
some in the white community justifies the racialised liberation nationalism of some in 
the ANC. Conversely, the distrust and scepticism of ANC leaders towards the white 
community and the state, can reinforce distrust in a negative dialectic that is enabled 
rather than disabled by processes of consultation between state and society in Hout 
Bay. Any attempt to build democratic citizenship will have to find ways to transform 
this negative dialectic in public spaces into one that affirms a common humanity and 
includes a greater diversity of voices.  
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There is an important asymmetry in this relationship however, that is linked to 
the dependence of poor communities on the state for service delivery. So long as the 
DA city remains reluctant to engage with what it perceives as partisan community 
representatives, and the ANC refuses to enable non-partisan representation, local 
leaders will find themselves on the horns of a legitimacy dilemma that affirms the 
party at the expense of development, or affirms development at the expense of the 
party. The historical demise of the Hout Bay civic in Hangberg and the enduring 
leadership crisis of SANCO in Imizamo Yethu, both prompted by the politics around 
development projects, suggests that sooner or later, new and non-partisan ways of 
expressing subaltern voice need to be found, or they may find their own way through 
more confrontational and disruptive channels. 
The Hout Bay case speaks to the enduring complexities of ‘mediated’ 
citizenship and the limits of liberal democracy in post-apartheid South Africa. The 
relative absence of inclusive formal institutions of political representation for 
marginalised groups has led to the rise of informal third-party mediation as the 
dominant form of political representation. While third-party mediators sometimes act 
in ways that produce and deepen democratic citizenship, they mostly reinforce 
exclusionary forms of political representation and with it, weaken democratic 
inclusion. Paying attention to the detailed and often contradictory logics (and 
expressions) of mediated citizenship becomes crucial for our understanding of the 
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Interviews/ Observations 
ANC leader, Ward 74 Branch Chair, interviewed by Laurence Piper, , 13 February 
2015, Hout Bay. 
City official, Solid Waste Management, City of Cape Town, interviewed by Laurence 
Piper, 07 April 2015, Cape Town. 
Community Policing Forum meeting, observed by Fiona Anciano, 28 July 2015,   
Hout Bay. 
Hangberg Pastorpastor, interviewed by Fiona Anciano, 20 August 2015, Hout Bay. 
Hout Bay Organised, Facebook site. Accessed May – August 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/houtbay/?fref=ts.    
in/formal south workshop, observed by Fiona Anciano, 29 July 2015, Hout Bay. 
Matt Mercer, Creator and editor of Hout Bay Organised Facebook Site, interviewed 
by Fiona Anciano, 9 April 2015, Hout Bay. 
PMF leader, interviewed by Fiona Anciano, 17 March 2015,.   Hout Bay. 
Ratepayers Association Committee Member, interviewed by Laurence Piper and 
Fiona Anciano, 17 August 2015, Hout Bay. 
SANCO leader, SANCO executive committee member, interviewed by Laurence 
Piper, 8 July 2014,. Hout Bay. 
 
                                                        
1 Hence, ‘rich developer and businessman Niall Mellon’ was on holiday in Cape Town in 2002, when 
he ‘was moved to establish the Niall Mellon Township Trust after he witnessed at first hand some of 
the impoverished living conditions in the Cape Town township of Imizamo Yethu’, 
https://www.melloneducate.com/about/our-story/. 
2 City official, Solid Waste Management, City of Cape Town, interviewed by Laurence Piper, 07 April 
2015, Cape Town. 
3 Hangberg Pastor, interviewed by Fiona Anciano, 20 August 2015, Hout Bay. 
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4 PMF leader, interviewed by Fiona Anciano, 17 March 2015,.   Hout Bay. 
5 ANC leader, Ward 74 Branch Chair, interviewed by Laurence Piper, Hout Bay, 13 February 2015. 
6 ANC leader, Ward 74 Branch Chair, interviewed by Laurence Piper, Hout Bay, 13 February 2015.  
7 ANC leader, Ward 74 Branch Chair, interviewed by Laurence Piper, Hout Bay, 13 February 2015. 
8 ANC leader, Ward 74 Branch Chair, interviewed by Laurence Piper, Hout Bay, 13 February 2015.. 
9 Ratepayers Association Committee Member, interviewed by Laurence Piper and Fiona Anciano, 17 
August 2015, Hout Bay. 
10 City official, Solid Waste Management, City of Cape Town, interviewed by Laurence Piper, 07 April 
2015, Cape Town. 
11 An interesting reflection of this tension can be read daily on the Facebook site, Hout Bay Organised. 
Set up and managed by a long-standing estate agent from the valley, it now has over 16 000 members   
(Matt Mercer, Creator creator and editor of Hout Bay Organised Facebook Sitesite, interviewed by 
Fiona Anciano, 9 April 2015, Hout Bay).   Issues such as crime in Imizamo Yethu, for example, are 
discussed and understood from various perspectives. There are certainly implicitly racist voices that 
attribute crime and violence to racial factors, but many other voices, from all racial groups, discuss 
systemic issues of poverty and unemployment, for example, and try to engage in open debate (Hout 
Bay Organised, Facebook site. Accessed May – AAugust 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/houtbay/?fref=ts). 
12 SANCO leader, SANCO executive committee member, interviewed by Laurence Piper, 8 July 2014., 
Hout Bay. 
13 in/formal south workshop, observed by Fiona Anciano, 29 July 2015, Hout Bay. 
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